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THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY CONTRACTS
IN MINNESOTA*
J. KENNETH DE WERFF**
F E and R enter into a contract for the benefit of B, who is not
a party to it, can B enforce that contract?
Briefly, this question raises the problem dealt with by the
common law doctrine of third party beneficiary contracts.1 The
problems are old. But the present doctrine designed for their
solution is comparatively young,' and it seems to illustrate very
clearly the truth of the United States Supreme Court's repeated
statement that "flexibility and capacity for growth and adaptation" 3
- tends to be the nature of the common law. At early common law only
a person -who was actually a party to the contract was entitled or
permitted to maintain an action upon it.4 But, broadly speaking,
. *Rules concerning statutory bonds and beneficiaries thereof are not
within the scope of this discussion. They have little, if any, bearing upon the
common law third party beneficiary contracts. Jefferson v. Asch, (1893) 53
Minn. 446, At. 449, 55 N. W. 604, 25 L. R. A. 257, 40 A. S. R. 325.
**Member of the Minnesota bar, of the bar of the United States District
Court for Minnesota, and of the bar of the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals, 8th Circuit; also a former contributor to the MINNESOTA L.W
REVIEW.
'Speaking generally in Feldman v. Arnold, (1924) 158 Minn. 243, 197
N. W. 219, the court said, at page 247, "In other words, this is a case where
a contract was made in the name of one party for the benefit of another."
-Authorities generally recognize that Lawrence v. Fox, (1859) 20 N. Y.
268, was the case which really launched the doctrine into legal significance
in America.
3Hurtado v. California, (1883) 110 U. S. 516, 530, 4 S. Ct. 111, 4 S. Ct.
292, 28 L. Ed. 232; Funk v. United States, (1933) 290 U. S. 371, 382, 54 S.
Ct. 212, 78 L. Ed. 369, 93 A.L.R. 1136. In his last opinion, a dissent, the late
Justice Royal Stone said of the third party beneficiary contract doctrine, "It
illustrates the fact that the common law is not a matured, rigid, and inert
mass. It is rather a live and growing organism, self-adapting to new problems
and new truths. While avowing respect to precedent, it owes no allegiance
either to ancient error or any concept invalidated by progress." Farmer's
State Bank v. Burns, (1942) 212 Minn. 455, at 472, 5 N. W. (2d) 589, 591.
For majority opinion, not considering this question, see 212 Minn. 455, 4 N.
W. (2d) 330.
4"Privity" and consideration were required before a successful action in
contract could be maintained. Street, 2 Foundations of Legal Liability 152
et seq; 2 Williston on Contracts Sec. 360, page 1053; Note, 77 A.L.R. 21;
Tweedle v. Atkinson, (1861) 1 B and S 393, 121 Eng. Reprints 762. See also
17 Corpus Juris Secundum, Contracts, Sec. 519 (b), page 1118. In Tomlinson
v. Gill, (1756) 1 Ambl. 330, 27 Eng. Reprint 221, however, the English
courts established a trust theory which permits recovery by the beneficiary.
It is still followed today. See Williston on Contracts, supra. The doctrine of
third party beneficiary contracts has been called an "American doctrine."
Barnes v. Hekla Ins. Co., (1893) 56 Minn. 38, 57 N. W. 314. For a detailed
article upon the English doctrine, see Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of
Third Persons, 46 Law Quart. Rev. 12.
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under the common law doctrine of third party beneficiary contracts
which is now recognized by the majority of American courts, one
who is not a party to the contract may recover in an action upon it
if the contract was made and intended for his befiefit.5 The change
from the old common law rule to the present one did not occur
suddenly. In fact, reading only a few of the many cases will indicate
clearly that the conversion process still is in progress in some
states.
The purpose of this article is to determine the status of the
third party beneficiary contract doctrine in Minnesota and, within
limits, what reasonably may be expected in the future. The problem
is important. Although the doctrine has been recognized as such
for less than 100 years,' it has been applied in contract cases deal-
ing with innumerable branches of the substantive law7 and 'often
the doctrine affords a most direct, economical and speedy means
for disposing of otherwise expensive and profitless litigation.8
I.
THE GENERAL PROPOSITION
A third party beneficiary contract situation arises when a
promisee (hereinafter sometimes called "E") and a promisor
(hereinafter sometimes called "R") enter into a contract for the
benefit of one who is not a party to the contract (hereinafter some-
times called "B"). It must be distinguished from the situation in
which X contracts with Y, and Z furnishes the consideration. And
it also is different from the case in which one's agent contracts
on his behalf. Moreover, it should not be confused with a trust or
--See annotations in 81 A.L.R. 1271 and 148 A.L.R. 359. Also see an-
notations in 21 A.L.R. 439, 47 A.L.R. 339, 47 A.L.R. 502, 49 A.L.R. 534, 63
A.L.R. 1381, 77 A.L.R. 21, 89 A.L.R. 446, and 2 Williston on Contracts,
See. 356, page 1041; 17 Corpus Juris Secundum, Contracts, Sec. 519 (c),
page 1121.
OSee note 2, supra. Sanders v. Clason, (1868) 13 Minn. 379 (Gil: 352) is
one of the earliest Minnesota cases recognizing the problem (by dictum).
But also note Van Eman v. Stanchfield, (1865) 10 Minn. 297 (Gil. 255).
-The problem has been raised, to mention only a few situations, in in-
surance law (Maxcy v. N. H. Fire Ins. Co., (1893) 54 Minn. 272, 55 N.
W. 1131) ; mortgage law (Follansbee v. Johnson, (1881) 28 Minn. 311, 9
N. W. 882); suretyship (St. Paul Foundry Co. v. Evenson, (1927) 169
Minn. 485, 211 N. W. 834, 213 N. W. 352) ; partnerships (Maxfield v.
Schwartz, (1890) 43 Minn. 221, 45 N. W. 429); railroad reorganizations
under Federal law (McCulloch v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co., (U. S. Dist.
Court for Minn. 1943) 53 Fed. Supp. 534) ; probate law (Mowry v.
Thompson (1933) 189 Minn. 479, 250 N. W. 52) ; and many other branches
of the substantive law.
Golden v. Lerch Bros., (1941) 211 Minn. 30, 300 N. W. 2071 footnote 3.
'See footnote 1, supra.
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subrogation situation. The third party beneficiary contract situation
is peculiar to itself.'0
Three general types of third party beneficiary contract situa-
tions exist: (1) A creditor beneficiary situation; (2) a donee
beneficiary situation, and (3) an incidental beneficiary situation."
The Restatement of Contracts2 defines each as follows:
"(1) Where performance of a promise in a contract will
benefit a person other than the promisee, that person is
(a) a donee beneficiary if it appears from the terms
of the promise in view of the accompanying circumstances
that the purpose of the promisee in obtaining the promise
of all or part of the performance is to make a gift to the
beneficiary ... ;
(b) a creditor beneficiary if no purpose to make a
gift appears from the terms of the promise in view of all
the accompanying circumstances and performance of the
promise will satisfy an actual or supposed or asserted duty
of the promisee to the beneficiary, .... ;
(c) an incidental beneficiary if neither the facts stated
in Clause (a) nor those stated in Clause (b) exist."
M innesota recognizes that these three beneficiary situations exist
factually and has spoken favorably of this definition.2 Obviously,
the three factual situations include every conceivable situation in
which a third party might receive a benefit from a contract made
by other persons. The three types differ in Minnesota in that the
donee and creditor situations contemplate receipt by the third party
of the performance or gift provided for by the contract. In the in-
1OFor a detailed and helpful discussion of these distinctions see 2 Willis-
ton on Contracts, Secs. 352-355, pages 1038-1041, or Williston, Contracts
for the Benefit of Third Persons, (1902) 15 -Harv. Law. Rev. 767, which
contairs substantially the same material, and Corbin, Contracts for the
Benefit of Third Persons, (1918) 27 Yale L. J. 1008.
"LaMourea v. Rhude, (1938) 209 Minn. 53, 295 N. W. 304.
'
2Restatement of Contracts, Sec. 133.
13LaMourea v. Rhude, (1938) 209 Minn. 53, 295 N. W. 304, speaks
of all three situations and the decision of that case is based upon the Re-
statement's conclusions. Jefferson v. Asch, (1893) 53 Minn. 446, 55 N. X.V.
604, 25 L.R.A. 257, 40 A.S.R. 325, also recognizes that donee and creditor
beneficiary situations can exist factually, but does not call them by name.
Marshall State Bank v. Buesing, (1929) 179 Minn. 77, 228 N. W. 348,
appears to be the first case which expressly refers to a "creditor beneficiary,"
and Dewey v. Kaplan, (1937) 200 Minn. 289, 274 N. W. 161, appears to be
the first Minnesota case which refers expressly to a "donee beneficiary."
The latter case also refers to "creditor beneficiary" and "incidental bene-
ficiary" situations. The Restatement of Contracts is referred to therein.
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cidental beneficiary situation, however, the third party receives
whatever he receives as an incident of the contract. No intent to
benefit him by the contract exists. The Minnesota Supreme Court
has expressed this distinction by pointing out that in an incidental
beneficiary situation the contract was made primarily in the interest
and for the benefit of the parties to the contract.14 In an incidental
beneficiary situation the benefit to the third party also is termed
"accidental,"' or "incidental," and the promise is not considered
as made "directly" for the third person's benefit. 6
Of course, the question immediately becomes, Why distinguish
between the situations? The question is answered by noting the
history of third party beneficiary contracts in Minnesota.
A.
The Enforcemcnt of Third Party Beneficiary Contracts
Minnesota always has unequivocally denied an incidental bene-
ficiary the right to enforce a contract to which he was not a party.'
7
And in Jefferson v. Asch,15 decided in 1893, the Minnesota Supreme
Court declared of B's rights in that case,
" . . . we are prepared to say that, where there is nothing but
the promise, no consideration from such a stranger, and no duty
or obligation to him on the part of the promisee, he cannot sue
upon it.
"To enforce such a promise in favor of a third party, where
there is no obligation to benefft him, nor anything such as near
relationship, nor any consideration from the third party, would
be much like enforcing an intended gift or gratuity."
Thus, B could not recover upon the contract between R and E
unless he could establish an equitable, legal, or moral obligation
I WVitzman v. Sjoberg, (1925) 164 2finn. 411, 205 N. W. 257. See also
Jefferson v. Asch, (1893) 53 Minn. 446, 55 N. W. 604. But see Morstain v.
Kirschcr, (1933) 190 Minn. 78, 250 N. W. 727, which seems to use the terms
lousely.
"UClark v. Hennessey Constr. Co., (1913) 122 Minn. 476, 478, 142 N.
W. 873.
'Greenwood v. Sheldon, (1883) 31 Minn. 254, 17 N. W. 478.
17Cruickshank v. Ellis, (1929) 178 Minn. 103, 226 N. W. 192; Witzman
v. Sjoberg, (1925) 164 Minn. 411, 205 N. W. 257. This rule has prevailed
in 'Minnesota from the'beginning, Greenwood v. Sheldon, (1883) 31 Minn.
254, 17 N. W. 478, and is still the rule; Lincoln Finance Corp. v. Doe, (1931)
183 Minn. 19, 235 N. W. 392.
11(1893) 53 Minn. 446, 451, 452, 55 N. V~r. 604, 25 L.R.A. 257, 39
A.S.R. 618.
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owed himself by the promisee which, by the contract, R promised
to satisfy.19
By this decision, the court early committed Minnesota to the
rule that a creditor beneficiary, but not a donee beneficiary, could
enforce the contract between E and R. It was justified upon the
theory that the donee beneficiary furnished no consideration and
was not privy to the contract
°
.
2
Under the Jefferson v. Asch doctrine, the obligation necessary
to a creditor beneficiary situation might be shown (1) by proving
a present or probable future monetary debt (not a mortgage debt)
owed or soon to be owed to B by E and which R promised to pay
in consideration for what he received from E;21 (2) by proving
that the promisor assumed and agreed to pay to B a mortgage debt
owed to B by E and for which E was personally liable to B ;' (3)
by proving that the promisor was surety on a contractor's bond
which concerned work or materials B was or would be furnishing
to the contractor or by proving that B was within the class which
the bond covered ;23 (4) by proving blood or moral relationship to
the promisee to -whom R made the promise,2 4 or (5) by proving
l9Jefferson v. Asch, (1893) 53 Minn. 446, 55 N. W. 604, 25 L.R.A. 257,
39 A.S.R. 618; Kramer v. Gardner, (1908) 104 Minn. 370, 116 N. W. 925.
St. Paul Foundry Co. v. Evenson, (1927) 169 Minn. 485, 211 N. V. 834,
213 N. W. 352, added the terminology, "or if the promisee has an interest
in having it discharged."
2OMarshall State Bank v. Buesing, (1929) 179 Minn. 77, 228 N. W.
348, (creditor beneficiary) ; General Elec. Co. v. Jordon, (1917) 137 Minn.
107, 162 N. W. 1061, LaMourea v. Rhude, (1940) 209 Minn. 53, 295
N. W. 304.2 lHawley v. Wilkinson, (1872) 18 Minn. 525. (Gil. 468) ; Barry v.
Jordan, (1911) 116 Minn. 34, 133 N. W. 78; Peterson v. Parviainen, (1928)
174 Minn. 297, 219 N. W. 180; see Saunders v. Clasen, (1868) 13 Minn.
379 (Gil. 352).22Follansbee v. Johnson, (1881) 28 Minn. 311, 9 N. W. 882; Wood v.
Johnson, (1912) 117 Minn. 267, 135 N. Xr. 746; Marshall State Bank v.
Buesing, (1929) 179 Minn. 77, 228 N. W. 348. The court also held that if
E was not personally liable to B for the mortgage debt, B could not recover
from R even if R assumed and agreed to pay the obligation, for no obligation
of E's was assumed and the general rule of third party beneficiary contracts
did not apply. Brown v. Stillman, (1890) 43 Minn. 126, 45 N. W. 2;
Nelson v. Rogers, (1891) 47 Minn. 103. 49 N. W. 526; Kramer v. Gardner.(1908) 104 Minn. 370, 116 N. W. 925; Clement v. Willett, (1908) 105 Minn.
267, 117 N. W. 491. Query if this broad rule is not suspended now that
donee beneficiary contracts have been held enforceable in Minnesota. (See
infra.)
23St. Paul Foundry Co. v. Evenson, (1927) 169 'inn. 485, 211 N. W.
834, 213 N. W. 352; Harriet State Bank v. Samels, (1925) 164 Minn. 265,
205 N. W. 938; Feldman v. Arnold, (1924) 158 Minn. 243, 197 N. W. 219.24Newton v. Newton, (1891) 46 Minn. 33, 48 N. W. 450; Clark v. Clark,
(1925) 164 Minn. 201, 204 N. W. 936; Mowry v. Thompson, (1933) 189
Minn. 479, 250 N. W. 52. See also Peterson v. Parviainen, (1928) 174 Minn.
297, 219 N. W. 180, which involves obligations arising out of an employer-
employee relationship, although not stressed by the court.
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that B was a citizen and/or inhabitant of the promisee municipality,
and was included within the scope of the agreement.2
Obviously, the fourth class was seldom, if ever, a creditor
beneficiary situation. And the rule of Jefferson v. Asch and the
strict classifications originally resulting from it were not permitted
to exist unmolested. Inroads upon them were gradually made.26
In fact, the donee beneficiaries often were permitted to assert
their rights in an action without mention of the rule enunciated in
Jefferson v. Asch. -7 And cases with fact situations showing less
and less existing obligations to B by E were included in the noted
classes.A By 1927 the court began to recognize that the strict rule
was no longer unassailable. It expressly recognized through Judge
Dibell, in St. Paul Foundry Co. v. Evenson2 (1927) that "the
trend of the law favors the right of the third party beneficiary to
recover in his own name in an action at law, and perhaps more
readily in jurisdictions where law and equity are fused," and the
court in that case then extended the rule of Jefferson v. Asch a
little further. In Peterson v. Parzviainen the court, apparently an-
ticipating the future, said, "Whatever may be the future attitude
of this court as to the main holding in Jefferson v. Asch, 53 Minn.
446, 55 N. W. 604, 25 L.R.A. 257, 39 A.S.R. 618, the facts in the
present case clearly bring it within the exception referred to in that
case. (italics supplied). But not until 1940 did the court finally
and expressly adopt the majority rule that a donee beneficiary can
enforce the contract bet-ween R and E. At that time the court de-
cided La Mourea v. Rhude2 ' and committed Minnesota to the
majority rule that a creditor or a donee beneficiary can recover
directly upon the contract .... " The decision, written by Justice
Stone, was unanimous. By it the rule of Jefferson v. Asch was "re-
"'Con-ider City of Red Wing v. Wisc.-M inn. Light and Power Co.,(1918) 139 Minn. 240, 166 N. W. 175, discussed in 2 MiNNEsoTA LAw RE-
vwrw 463. This case seems to indicate that the Minnesota court would have
permitted recovery by a citizen of a municipality even before LaMourea v.
Rhude was decided. The Rhude case does not refer to this case, which is
factually similar.
-"S'ee cases cited in footnote 2 of La'Mourea v. Rhude, (1940) 209 Minn.
53. 55, 295 N. W. 304; also consider Knifel v. Keller, (1940) 207 Minn.
10'9, 29o N. W. 218.
'-Odenbreit v. Utheim, (1915) 131 Minn. 56, 154 N. W. 741; Laird v.
Vila. (1904) 83 Minn. 45, 100 N. W. 656.
->St. Paul Foundry Co. v. Evenson, (1927) 169 Minn. 485, 211 N. W.
834, 213 N. W. 352, held expressly that E need only have an "interest" in
having the obligation assumed by R satisfied.
-"See note 28.
.( 1928) 174 Minn. 297. 301. 302, 219 N. XV. 180.
1209 Minn. 53, 295 N. W. 204.
z-'25 'MINNESOTA LAW REvIEw.
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stated," and its premise that the lack of consideration and privity
on the part of donee B prevented him from recovering was over-
ruled expressly.
La Mourea v. Rhude seems entirely correct in over-ruling a
case applying such rules to third party beneficiary contracts. Many
authorities and the majority of American courts recognize that it
is unsound in these modern days to deprive a donee beneficiary of
the right to recover, as did the decision in Jefferson v. Asch, because
he is not privy to the contract and has furnished no consideration.3
If R contracts directly with B and E furnishes the considera-
tion, B obviously can now (and long has been able to) enforce the
contract,34 although at common law he could not do so.33 How that
situation can be distinguished in principle from a third party bene-
ficiary contract situation insofar as consderation is concerned is
difficult to understand. Moreover, the doctrine of promissory
estoppel, now recognized in Minnesota,36 and the doctrine of Rye
v. Phillips7 recognize that the lack of legally sufficient considera-
tion or even consideration itself is not fatal in justifiable cases.
Certainly consideration is furnished by someone in a third party
beneficiary contract situation. The doctrine does not deprive any-
one of consideration or, like the other doctrines mentioned, omit
the consideration requirement.3" R receives compensation for what
he does. E is the only person who is "out of pocket" by the trans-
action, and he intends to be. Certainly the strict requirement of
consideration can be overlooked just as properly in the donee
beneficiary contract situation as in the other situations noted. Here,
as there, the intent of the parties should govern. Justice Stone ex-
pressed the argument very concisely in his concurring opinion in
Peterson v. Parviainen.39 He said,
332 Williston on Contracts, Sec. 356, page 1041. Some states have
granted both a donee and a creditor beneficiary a right of action by statute.
See, for example, Calif. Civil Code, Sec. 1559; Idaho Code Annot. (1932)
Art. 28-102; North Dakota Comp. Laws (1913) Civ. Code 5841. For a
general discussion, see 2 Williston on Contracts, Sec. 365, page 1066.34Van Eman v. Stanchfield, (1865) 10 Minn. 197 (Gil. 255); Corpus
Juris Secundum, Contracts, Sec. 74, page 427.35The early common law rule required at one time that the considera-
tion move from the promisee or plaintiff. Street, 2 Foundations of Legal
Liability, 152 et seq.3OThom v. Thom, (1940) 208 Minn. 461, 294 N.W. 461; Restatement
of Contracts, Minnesota Annotations, Sec. 90.37Rye v. Phillips, (1938) 203 Minn. 567, 282 N. W. 459, 119 A.L.R.
1120; 23 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 223.
3SA third party beneficiary cannot enforce the contract if R received no
consideration for his promise. See "Defenses," infra.
39(1928) 174 Minn. 297, 303, 219 N. W. 180.
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"Consideration is a test of actionability, a determinant of the
presence of obligation, and not of its quantity or the identity of
the obligee. In express contract we look not at all to the source
of the consideration but exclusively to the terms of the agreement
to determine by whom and against whom its obligations are en-
forceable, and it is common to find an enforceable obligation in
favor of one who has furnished no consideration. It is, therefore,
no objection to an action on an express contract by a beneficiary
of it that he did not furnish or was not a party to the considera-
tion."
The requirement of privity belongs to the old common law, not
to modern doctrines such as third party beneficiary contracts. Con-
tinued support of such a technical common law rule without any
further justification than its common law existence40 afford only an
excuse, not a reason, for its preservation, and it ignores the trend
away from the technical common law rules41 and toward the
adoption of modern codes for modern practice .42
One of the few reasons for so preserving the requirement of
privity today might be the desire to assure performance of the
contract according to the intent and desire of the parties who made
it. In the absence of illegality or some comparable objection, a
contract concededly should be performed to and by the persons
whom the parties paying for such performance intended and desired
should receive or make performance. Adherence to the privity re-
quirement might be justifiable if its object were to accomplish
this purpose Itnd protect the parties to the contract. But because
the third party donee and creditor beneficiary contracts both de-
4"The Minnesota Supreme Court invariably referred to the privity re-
quirement in donee beneficiary cases without stating reasons which wouldjustify its continued existence. For example, see Greenwood v. Sheldon,
(1883) 31 Minn. 254, 17 N. W. 478, in which Chief Justice Gilfillan held,
at page 255, "Allowing a stranger to a contract to maintain an action to
enforce its stipulation is inconsistent with the general rule that to sustain
such an action, there must be privity of contract between the parties; . . !"
See also Union Ry. Storage Co. v. McDermott, (1893) 53 Minn. 407, 55
N. W. 606; Wood v. Johnson, (1912) 117 Minn. 267, 135 N. W. 746; and
Jefferson v. Asch, (1893) 53 Minn. 446, 55 N. W. 604, 25 L.R.A. 257, 39
A.S.R. 618.
"Ironically, Jefferson v. Asch, 53 Minn. 446, held, at pages 448 and
449, that third party beneficiary contracts under seal would be decided hence-
forth according to the same rules applied to simple contracts which raised
third party beneficiary questions because "If there ever was any reason for
the distinction, it could only have been a technical one, which no longer has
any merit to commend it, and we do not think we ought to recognize it."
4Street, 2 Foundations of Legal Liability, 152 et seq. In St. Paul
Foundry Co. v. Evenson, (1927) 169 Minn. 485, 211 N. W. 834, 213 N. W.
352, Judge Dibell said, at page 488, "The trend of the law favors the right
of the third party beneficiary to recover in his own name in an action at
law, and perhaps more readily in jurisdictions where law and equity are
fused." They are fused in Minnesota.
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pend for their existence upon the intent and wishes of the parties
to the contract, surely this doctrine would itself better guarantee
fulfillment of that desire than would the preservation of a doctrine
(privity) which prevents the achievement of that end.4 3
One writer has suggested that to apply the rule of "privity""
to third party beneficiary contract situations is historically un-
sound. A M\1innesota Supreme Court Justice first objected with
specific reasons to the "privity" requirement in third party bene-
ficiary contract situations in Peterson v. Parviainen.43 In that case
Justice Stone said, in a concurring opinion,
"Another reason formerly urged in support of the doctrine of
Jefferson v. Asch was that the beneficiary, as distinguished from
a party to a contract, was not in privity with those who were
parties. With respect to contracts, privity is an effect rather than
a cause. It denotes 'mutual or successive relationship to the same
rights of property' (6 Wd. & Phr. 5606) or 'the relationship' be-
tween contracting parties. 3 Bouvier, Law Dic. 2722. It signifies
a relationship and not what creates it. Privity of contract arises
from the agreement which vests certain rights and imposes obliga-
tions from which privity results. So, with respect either to a party
or a beneficiary, the first thing to determine is what rights he has
under the contract; and if the presence of right be determined,
privity necessarily follows. And if, with respect either to a party
or a beneficiary, there is a right to enforce a contract, there is
necessarily the relationship called privity. Therefore, to say that
there is no right because there is no privity, rather than that there
is no privity because there is no right, is a plain case of transposing
the cart and horse."
In the Rhude Case the same judge, speaking for a now unanimous
court, said,4
6
"Privity, in the law of contracts, is merely the name for a
legal relation arising from right and obligation. For example, A,
by contract, secures a promise from B. A may transfer his right
of enforcement to C. C thereby succeeds to A's right of action, and,
in consequence, comes into the relationship with A and B which
we call privity of contract. Instead of waiting to do it by assign-
ment, A may, at the outset, exact from B the same promise in
431n LaMourea v. Rhude, (1940) 209 Minn. 53, 295 N. W. 304, Justice
Stone said at page 56 of the holding that a donee beneficiary could enforce
the contract, "An opposite holding would defeat obligation where obligation
is not only intended but also expressed and paid for . . . In the contractual
promise for the benefit of one not a party, there is nothing illegal or
contrary to public policy. The promise is within the right of one party to
exact and the other to make." No dissents were registered to this statement.44Street, 2 Foundations of Legal Liability, 152 et Seq.4 5Justice Stone stated specific reasons for his objections in his con-
curring opinion, found in 174 Minn. 297, 302, 219 N. W. 180.
46(1940)-209 Minn. 53, 57, 295 N. W. 304.
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favor of C. It is enforceable by C, who thereby has come directly
into legal relationship with B. That illustrates the normal course
of things resulting in privity of contract, which is but a descriptive
term, designating effect rather than cause. In short, privity of
contract is legal relationship to the contract or its parties. To affirm
one's right under a contract is, therefore, to affirm his privity
with the party liable to him.
"That simple truth removes the difficulty arising from the
complicated notions expressed by judges and text writers concern-
ing privity of contract. The term has been much misused."
In any event, what equitable reason justifies discrimination
between creditor and donee beneficiary contracts with respect to
their being enforceable? In principle they cannot be distinguished.
A creditor beneficiary, like a donee, is actually a gratuitous bene-
ficiary. Neither type of beneficiary pays anything for their rights.
As a practical matter, the creditor beneficiary who recovers upon
the contract violates the outmoded rule of "privity" just as surely
as does the donee beneficiary who recovers. He is no more a direct
party to the contract than is a donee beneficiary. The belief that
the obligation owed by E makes a creditor beneficiary privy to the
contract but that the "gift" from E does not make a donee bene-
ficiary privy to the contract subscribes to common law fiction, not
to a willingness that modern law conform to the ideal of reality.
Fictions furnish only an excuse, not a reason. The original rules of
privity do not seem to require such a distinction. It is submitted
that, in the final analysis, the only real connection which either the
donee or creditor beneficiary has with the contract arises from
the promise and intent of the parties.
Further, the case of Lawrence v. Fox,47 from which Minnesota
obtained its third party beneficiary contract doctrine,4 8 intended
to hold generally that both a donee and creditor beneficiary could
recover.'" So the precedent for the new Minnesota doctrine supports
it.
Finally, the Minnesota court recognizes that the third party
beneficiary contract doctrine is applied because "Justice would be
imperfectly administered if no exceptions were allowed to that gen-
eral rule" "that an action on contract cannot be maintained unless
'7(1869) 20 N. Y. 268.
41St. Paul Foundry v. Evenson, (1927) 169 Minn. 485, 211 N. W. 834,
213 N. W. 352. See also Jefferson v. Asch, (1893) 53 Minn. 446, 55 N.
W. 604.
'"Seaver v. Ransome, (1918) 224 N. Y. 233, 120 N. E. 639, 2 A.L.R.
1187.
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there is privity of contract between the parties." 0 If justice re-
quires the exception as to creditor beneficiaries, what sound reason
forbids such justice to donee beneficiaries? The arguments in
favor of the former are, at least for the most part, applicable also
to the latter. The mere fact that one is a creditor should not
necessarily entitle him to a higher standing in a court of justice
than one who is not a creditor, who gives just as much for his
rights as does the creditor (i. e., nothing), and whose recovery
does not affect the rights or assets of that creditor's debtor. Law
and equity being fused, the court, if properly apprised of the
problem, can forestall any double recoveries by a creditor bene-
ficiary.51 The original intent and hopes of all the parties to the
contract will be realized. And that elusive "justice" will invariably
result to all parties. The trend today is towards the enforcement
of both the donee and the creditor beneficiary type of contracts.Y-
The doctrine is an American one. It does not look to the common
law for its origin.53 It is a matter of modern public policy.
In view of these premises, therefore, the Minnesota Supreme
Court seems to have been clearly correct when it decided La
Mourea v. Rhude and placed this state in accord with the general
rule that a creditor beneficiary and a donee beneficiary may enforce
the contract made by R and E for his (B's) benefit, absent any
valid defense in favor of R.
Some members of the bar have suggested that the rule of La
Mourea v. Rhude is limited to the rule that B may sue where he
is a resident or citizen of the promisee municipality which enters
into a contract for his benefit. A special class of cases does recognize
that the relationship between a municipality and its inhabitants
creates obligations between them which permits the inhabitant
to sue upon a contract made for the benefit of the class to which
he belongs.' 4 But La Mourea v. Rhude is not confined to this rule.
It requires no obligation or relationship between B and E.
The case commences with the premise that the doctrine of Jef-
ferson v. Asch, which required an obligation from the promisee, is
5OFollansbee v. Johnson, (1881) 28 Minn. 311, 9 N. W. 882.
"'Heins v. Byers, (1928) 174 Minn. 350, 219 N. W. 287 (quoted on
page 458). See also Gustafson v. Koehler, (1929) 177 Minn. 115, 225 N.
W. 699.
5-St. Paul Foundry Co. v,. Evenson, (1927) 169 Minn. 485, at 488, 211
N. W. 834, 213 N. W. 352. See quotation in footnote 42, supra.
-In Barnes v. Hekla Fire Ins. Co., (1893) 56 Minn. 38, 57 N. W.
314, the court observed, "It is called the 'American doctrine' because peculiar
to the courts in this country."
-
4Restatement of Contracts, Sec. 145; also see footnote 25, supra.
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outmoded and needs restatement. It then proceeds to cite Sec.
133 of Restatement of Contracts as authority which correctly re-
states the rule. That states the donee rule broadly, not only with
respect to the municipality cases. The opinion then recognizes
that a specific section of the Restatement (Sec. 145) covers the
problem at hand. That section, concededly, pertains to a situation
which is enforceable because of the declared obligation from the
municipal promisee to the beneficiary. But the court immediately
qualifies its reference to that section by pointing out that actually
the specific rule stems from the general one which was first stated
in the opinion. And then the court makes itself perfectly clear and
shows that it rested its decision upon the general donee beneficiary
rule, and not the creditor beneficiary rule which requires an obli-
gation of the promisee. For after discussing the problem at hand in
general terms without reference to any obligation owed by the
promisee, and after referring to the "contrary" doctrine of Jef-
ferson v. Asch (which required an obligation of E), it says,5
"Under the rule as we zview it, such obligation is immaterial"
(italics supplied).
Privity is expressly abandoned. So, clearly the decision is based
upon no theory of an obligation being satisfied between the parties.
Nothing in the opinion speaks of relationship between E and B.
And in Schau v. Buss,5 0 decided about the same time as the Rhude
Case. the court expressly applied the rule of the Rhude Case to a
situation in which a title insurance company promised a home
owner that it would pay certain laborers. The laborer was held to
possess a cause of action upon that promise. So, again the court
showed that municipality promisee fact situation is not the basis
for the rule in the Rhude Case. And in Farmer's State Bank v.
Purns.7 justice Stone, who wrote the opinion in the Rhude Case,
said of it that it gave a cause of action both to a donee and to a
creditor beneficiary. To avoid its broad rule that all donee bene-
ficiary contracts are enforceable, the court either must overrule
that case or forget it. To distinguish it seems basically impossible.
Crnsequently, it seems clear that Minnesota now recognizes
the donee beneficiary contract also, and that, subject to the rules
noted under the heading, "Defenses," both a third party creditor
and a donee beneficiary may maintain in Minnesota an action on
:(1940) 209 Minn. 53, 57, 295 N. W. 304.
:"( 1940) 209 Minn. 99, 104, 295 N. W. 910.
,7(1942) 212 Minn. 455, 5 N. W. (2d) 589, 590. The majority opinion,
4 N. W. (2d) 330, does not affect this statement.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
the contract between R and E. When dealing with these problems,
however, the Minnesota conflict of laws rule regarding third party
beneficiary contracts must be kept in mind. It provides that the
law of the State in which the third party beneficiary contract is
made and performable governs questions of the contract's exist-
ence and performance.
The beneficiary may assert his rights against R at law and
recover damages59 or, if the legal remedy is inadequate, he may
secure specific performance in equity. 0 Minnesota's original theory
for enforcing a creditor beneficiary contract was that something
in the nature of a trust existed.61 The Court also has hinted at the
so-called "agency" theory.62 That is, that E was B's agent in the
transaction. Both theories are fictitious, and later cases have not
mentioned them. In view of the court's increasingly liberal decisions
in third party beneficiary contract situations, culminating in its
commendable position in La Mourea v. Rhude, the court seems
in an ideal position to say expressly that trust or agency theories
are no longer the basis for enforcing third party beneficiary con-
tracts in Minnesota. Action on a contract theory seems the most
desirable and realistic and has been so recognized.6 3
5sClement v. Willett, (1908) 105 Minn. 267, 117 N. W. 491; Wood v.
Johnson, (1912) 117 Minn. 267, 135 N. W. 746; McCulloch v. Canadian
Pacific Ry. Co., (U. S. Dist. Court, Minn., 1943) 53 Fed. Supp. 534, 540;
Federal Surety Co. v. Mpls. Steel & Mach. Co., (8 C.C.A., 1927) 17 Fed.
(2d) 242, 245.
59LaMourea v. Rhude, (1940) 209 Minn. 53, 295 N. W. 304.
6ONewton v. Newton, (1891) 46 Minn. 33, 48 N. W. 450; Fiske v.
Lawton, (1913). 124 Minn. 85, 144 N. W. 455.
61In Follansbee v. Johnson, (1881) 28 Minn. 311, 9 N. V. 882, the
court said, at page 312, ". . . the consideration retained might well be re-
garded as held in the nature of a trust for the persons indicated by the
contract." In Greenwood v. Sheldon, (1883) 31 Minn. 254, at 255, the court
said of B's actions, "In this state the courts have not sustained such an
action except where the contract created a duty or relation in the nature
of a trust."
62Consider Michaud v. Erickson, (1909) 108 Minn. 356, 122 N. W. 324.
0OFor discussion of the theories, see Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit
of Third Persons, (1918) 27 Yale L. J. 1008; Williston, Contracts for the
Benefit of a Third Person, 15 Harv. L. Rev. 767. In Barnes v. Hekla Fire
Ins. Co., (1893) 56 Minn. 38, 57 N. W. 314, the court said, at page 42, "It
is an equitable rule, adopted for convenience, and to avoid circuity of action,
and the formality of an assignment by the original debtor of the new agree-
ment with him, and is strictly in accord with the intention of the parties
to the contract in creating a liability in favor of a third party creditor." In
Minnesota the action seems to be in contract. McCulloch v. Canadian
Pacific Ry., (U. S. Dist. Ct. for Minn., 1943) 53 Fed. Supp. 534. See also
Justice Stone's dissent in Farmer's Stat Bank v. Burns, (1942) 212 Minn.
455, 472.
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B.
Existence Tests
Because the enforcement of both donee and creditor beneficiary
contracts seems clear in Minnesota, a more detailed study of the
problems which arise when creating them seems desirable. As
summarily noted heretofore, the donee and creditor beneficiary
contract situations are distinguishable from the incidental bene-
ficiary situation in Minnesota upon the basis of intent.
When determining if the factual situation presents a donee or
creditor beneficiary situation as distinguished from an incidental
beneficiary situation, the court invariably has resorted to one of
three tests which, for brevity, will be called (1) the "intent to
benefit" test," (2) the "contract made for the benefit of B" test
and (3) the "intent to permit B to enforce the contract" test.66
The court never has discussed which test it prefers or why three
exist. A count of the cases using each theory indicates, however,
that the second test has been used more often than the others. The
third test has been used seldom.
In the first test the court considers if, although the promise
was made directly to another, it was "intended to benefit" the
third person.17 In the second test the court determines "for whose
benefit the promise was made"0 " or "for whose benefit the contract
was made."'. In the third test the court inquires if the contract "was
intended to give persons in the position of plaintiff (B) the right
to maintain an action upon it."'70 One case71 appears to have con-
.;4Maxfield v. Schwartz, (1890) 43 M1inn. 221, 45 N. W. 429, 10 L.R.A.
606;- Feldman v. Arnold, (1924) 158 Minn. 243, 197 N. W. 219.
.1'"Follansbee v. Johnson, (1881) 28 Minn. 311, 9 N. W. 882; Sayre v.
Burdock, (1891) 47 Minn. 367, 50 N. W. 245; Peterson v. Parviainen,
(1928) 174 Minn. 297, 219 N. W. 180.
GOMoore v. Mann, (1915) 130 Minn. 318, 153 N. W. 609; St. Paul
Foundry Co. v. Evenson, (1927) 169 Minn. 485, 211 N. W. 834, 213 N. W.
352; see also Cruickshank v. Ellis, (1929) 178 Minn. 103, 104, 226 N. W. 192.
':Feldman v. Arnold, (1924) 158 \inn. 243, 197 N. W. 219.
" Stariha v. Greenwood, (1881) 28 Minn. 521, 11 N. W. 76; Sayrp v.
Burdock (1891) 47 Minn. 367, 50 N. W. 245; Bosting v. Northern Trust
Co., (1895) 61 Minn. 307, 63 N. W. 721.
I'Kriske v. Jevne, (1928) 174 Mfinn. 484, 219 N. W. 766; Wood v.
Johnson. (1912) 117 Minn. 267, 135 N. W. 746; Maxcy v. N. H. Fire Ins.
Co., (1893) 54 Minn. 272, 55 N. W. 1130. Although the court variously
speaks of the promise and/or the contract as the basis of the second test,
it makes no distinction between them in applying the test. In reality, of
course, any distinction would be imaginary.
7'See footnote 66, supra.
7lMichaud v. Erickson, (1909) 108 Minn. 356, 122 N. W. 324.
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sidered mainly whether a benefit was received by the third party
and to have slighted the question of intent. But such a test seems
so contrary to the general Minnesota tests that probably no at-
tention need be paid to it. 72
The first and second tests seem identical in substance but dif-
ferent in expression. For the court must determine what the
parties intended, or meant, in their contract before it can determine
whether the contract was made for the benefit of B. And the court
seems to determine the intent under the second test, although often
it does not speak expressly of intent.
The third test presents a peculiar problem. Generally speaking.
"intent" creates a factual situation and the court determines
whether the law should enforce that factual situation in view of
the rules of law and sound public policy. According to this test,
however, the intent determines the enforceability of the promise.
If 'it is applied according to its potentials, it seems objectionable
for obvious reasons.7 3
That the "intent" tests are sound seems to follow from the
conclusion that the court correctly refuses an incidental beneficiary
a right of recovery. Any other practical test would probably re-
quire a relaxing of that rule. The need for a test like "intent"
seems inherent in the very nature of the third party beneficiary
contract situations. It is a limiting, but not a prohibiting, influence.
Because of it, no avalanche of recoveries upon third party bene-
ficiary contracts seems likely, and if it is applied strictly, recovery
will tend to result only in those cases where the third party is
justly entitled to it.
When applying the tests, however, the Minnesota court, like
other courts, encounters difficult. 74 For in some cases, as mortgage
assumption cases, recovery is permitted in situations in which the
promisee's main purpose for entering into the contract was to
72Certainly such a test seems contrary to the rule that an incidental
beneficiary cannot recover, for if the benefit resulting to B from the con-
tract between R and E were the sole test, many incidental beneficiaries
could recover. This is true also if the "intent" necessary in the other tests
is based upon the benefits actually received by B. It is submitted that the
actual benefit received by B should be used only to raise the question of
whether a third party donee or creditor beneficiary contract exists in a
given situation, not to settle the question.
73Corbin, Third Parties as Beneficiaries of Contractors' Surety Bonds,
(1928) 38 Yale L. J. 1; 2 Williston on Contracts, Sec. 356 A, p. 1045.7 41n St. Paul Foundry Co. v. Evenson, (1927) 169 Minn. 485, Judge
Dibell observed, at page 488, that the third party beneficiaries rules in-
volve "difficulties in application and some confusion in the limitations and
conditions attached to it."
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benefit himself. 75, Apparently the Restatement of Contracts did not
expressly adopt the intent test in creditor beneficiary situations76
for this reason.77 (See page 438, supra, for definition.) The Min-
nesota court, however, apparently does not agree that purpose
necessarily determines intent, and the court soundly adheres to the
intent theory both in creditor and donee beneficiary contract situa-
tions. Application of the test, however, brings Minnesota in sub-
stantial agreement with the Restatement, for the court tends to
find a creditor beneficiary situation to exist when R assumes E's
obligation to B and his performance will satisfy the obligation. This
result is the one also obtained under the Restatement rule. Minne-
sota apparently reasons that E intends B to receive something (at
least R's performance of his promise) and, therefore, a sufficient
intent to benefit B exists. Under the Minnesota test, however, a
creditor beneficiary contract does not seem inevitable when R as-
sumes E's obligation. A clear indication of a contrary intent might
change the result. The court has so indicated.--
The same "intent" tests used to determine the existence of a
creditor beneficiary contract are used to determine the existence
of a donee beneficiary contractY.7 The test, of course, raises a fact
question. So each case turns on its own facts.89 When determining
75See cases cited in footnote 22; also see 2 Williston on Contracts, Sec.
356 A.
7"Illustration 12 of Section 133, Restatement of Contracts, seems to
indicate that, although Section 133 (1) (a) refers to "purpose" in defining
a donee beneficiary situation, actually the Restatement continues to rely
upon "intent."
77See 2 Williston on Contracts, Sec. 356, page 1047. Professor Williston
was the Reporter for this part of the Restatement of Contracts. (See page
v of the Restatement of Contracts.)
7 Consider Brown v. Stillman, (1890) 45 Minn. 126, 45 N. W. 2. The
Restatement of Contracts appears to attempt to abolish the "intent" theory
in creditor beneficiary situations. (2 Williston on Contracts, Sec. 356A, page
1047.) However, query if an incidental beneficiary under the intent rule
could not recover under the strict wording of the Restatement rule. Or does
the intent enter into the determination of the creditor beneficiary situation,
as defined by the Restatement, by virtue of the requirement that no purpose
to make a gift can appear? Consider footnote 76.
71Compare LaMourea v. Rhude, 209 Minn. 53, 295 N. W. 304, (a donee
beneficiary situation) and Peterson v. Parviainen, (1928) 174 Minn. 297, 219
N. W. 180 (a creditor beneficiary situation).
"'See Fiske v. Lawton, (1913) 124 Minn. 85, 144 N. W. 455; see also
Moore v. Mann, (1915) 130 Minn. 318, 153 N. W. 609, in which Judge
Dibell said, at page 319, "Nothing is to be gained by investigating the
cases where one is permitted to sue on a promise made to another for his
benefit." Compare Nelson v. Rogers, (1891) 47 Minn. 103, 49 N. W. 526,
in which the court held that even if a mortgagor's grantee assumed the
mortgage, a lack of intent to benefit is "presumed" if the mortgage obliga-
tion had not been assumed by the mortgagor. This result no longer seems
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if the facts show the required intent or whether the contract was
made for the benefit of a third party, the court looks to almost any-
thing which may throw light upon the problem. "The acts and
stipulations of the parties viewed in the light of the conditions
which existed and the obvious purpose sought to be accomplished
... ,, the reasonableness or equitableness of the interpretation in
light of the facts, the parties' relation to the subject matter of the
contract,8 2 the wording of the contract,83 whether its purpose could
be achieved if an intent to benefit B existed," the promissor's in-
terest in the transaction, and the general situation existing when
the contract was made,85 common experience, 0 whether B knew of
the contract,87 the power of control which E retained over per-
formance of the contract and whether the obligation to E is con-
sistent with a duty to B,8S are some of the factors upon which the
court has relied in determining the uncertain intent of the parties.
If a contract contains an express provision that it was made for
the benefit of the third party, however, the court relies upon that
statement.8 9 Consequently, persons wishing to assure recognition of
their intent to the fullest possible extent might be able to achieve
their objective by including such an express provision in their
necessary since LaMourea v. Rhude, (1940) 209 Minn. 53, 295 N. W. 304.
Professor Corbin suggests that it would not be unreasonable to draw an
invariable inference that a mortgagee was contemplated as a beneficiary
in the assumption contract between the mortgagor and his grantee, and that
the mortgagee was the holder of a new and additional right of action. Corbin,
Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons, (1927) 27 Yale L. J. 1008, 1018.
Although "intent" originally was the test applied in mortgage cases, in
Minnesota, Follansbee v. Johnson, (1881) 28 Minn. 311, 9 N. W. 882, the
court often relies merely upon precedent now when determining if a third
party beneficiary contract exists. Also see 2 Williston on Contracts, 15 Harn.
L. Rev. 791.
81Feldman v. Arnold, (1924) 158 Minn. 243, 197 N. W. 219.82Brown v. Stillman, (1890) 43 Minn. 126, 45 N. W. 2.83Moore v. Mann, (1915) 130 Minn. 318, 153 N. W. 609.
84St. Paul Foundry Co. v. Evenson, (1927) 169 Minn. 485, 211 N. W.
834, 213 N. W. 352.
85Gaffney v. Sederberg, (1911) 114 Minn. 319, 131 N. W. 333.
s6Odenbreit v. Utheim, (1915) 131 Minn. 56, 154 N. W. 741.
57Witzman v. Sjoberg, (1925) 164 Minn. 411, 205 N. W. 257.
$$Clark v. Hennessey Constr. Co., (1913) 122 Minn. 476, 142 N. W. 837.
89Kniefel v. Keller, (1940) 207 Minn. 109, 290 N. W. 218. "Such an
agreement ...having been made expressly for plaintiff's benefit he may
maintain an action thereon against the defendant . . . ." Pullman v. Adam-
son, (1890) 43 Minn. 511, 512, 45 N. W. 1132. The provision in Kniefel v
Keller, supra, read, "This agreement is for the express benefit of the
debtor(s) or any of them, as well as the Federal Land Bank of St. Paul,
the Land Bank Commissioner, and the Federal Farm Mortgage Corpora-
tion." (The court seems to consider some phrases sufficiently express to
show an intent even though they do not mention intent. 'Mortgage assumup-
tion clauses are an example.)
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contract. It is submitted also that a short statement of the reasons
for such intent would help if the situation created by the contract
is not such a one as would necessarily create a benefit to the in-
tended third person. By specifically naming the only third party (or
parties) intended to be benefited, and specifically excluding all
others, the performance of the contract in accordance with the in-
tent of the parties would be better guaranteed. Conversely, the
parties to a contract intended only for their own benefit might be
able to avoid compelled performance of the contract to an incidental
beneficiary. Although situations in which the express words might
be avoided can be imagined, those situations would seem to be the
unusual rather than the usual ones ° if Minnesota continues to
adhere to the "intent" tests for donee and creditor beneficiary
contracts.
The intent of the promisee appears to be the intent which
governs in Minnesota." Certainly the promisor's intent would seem
less important. He receives consideration for his performance, and
he generally would be little concerned in determining to whom the
contract should require him to perform.
Briefly, therefore, the Minnesota Supreme Court's position with
respect to the creation and enforceability of third party beneficiary
contracts may be summarized as follows:
(a) Both third party donee and creditor beneficiary contracts
are enforceable in Minnesota in the absence of a valid defense (as
hereinafter noted).
(b) The existence of both types of contract is determined by
the test whether the contract was made for the benefit of a third
party, which, in effect, is a test of the promisee's intent.
These conclusions seem to be a justifiable reason for inquiring
whether the distinction between donee and creditor beneficiary
contract situations should be preserved when determining if a
third party beneficiary contract cognizable in law or equity exists
in a given situation. Both are recognized as enforceable and the
existence of both is determined by the same test. Both are really
gratuitous situations with respect to B. If the mortgage class of
f'"In connection with this problem, consider Professor Corbin's obser-
vations referred to in footnote 80. Can express words such as these change
a rule of absolute substantive law permitting or denying the right to recover?
It is submitted that they would and should not do so.
"-
1Consider Jefferson v. Asch, (1893) 53 Minn. 446, 55 N. W. 604, 25
L.R.A. 257, 39 A.S.R. 325; Union Ry. Storage Co. v. McDermott, (1893)
53 Minn. 407, 55 N. AV. 606; also note the wording of the definitions in the
Restatement of Contracts, Sec. 133.
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creditor beneficiary contracts becomes a class unto itself, little
reason why the two could not be treated similarly in Minnesota
seems apparent. For in the other situations the court generally
applies the intent theory somewhat realistically. Little adjustment
in the application of the rules would seem necessary.
C.
"Defenses"
If a donee or creditor beneficiary situation exists, what defenses
may be raised to prevent its enforcement in an action by the bene-
ficiary ?
According to the majority of American Courts, the beneficiary's
rights against the promisor are no better and no greater than those
possessed by the promisee. 2 Minnesota decisions follow this rule.
In Ma.rfield v. Schwartze the Minnesota Supreme Court stated of
the beneficiary's rights against the promisor,
"These plaintiffs have no rights under this alleged contract.
so far as appears, superior to those of Beren & Nachtsheim (the
promisees) .... If the contract sued upon was affected by any in-
firmity which would have constituted a defense to an action on it
by Berens and Nachtsheim, the same defense may be made as
against the plaintiffs."
Consequently, the general rule that defenses good against the
promisee are good against the beneficiary prevails in Minnesota.
Justice Mitchell pointed this out in Gold v. Ogden,"' when he said,
without any dissents,
"All the authorities, however, are agreed that ... he (B) ac-
quires no greater rights than the . . . promisee has, and takes the
covenant, if at all, subject to all the defenses, legal or equitable,
which should have been available against the latter (E)."
But the defense must be pleaded affirmatively in order to be effec-
tiveY5 Although these cases represent creditor beneficiary situa-
92Note, 81 A.L.R. 1271, at 1292; 2 Williston on Contracts, Secs. 394, 395,
pages 136, 137; 17 Corpus Juris Secundum, Contr., Sec. 529, page 1152.
93(1890) 45 Minn. 150, 152, 47 N. W. 448, 10 L.R.A. 606. See also
Rogers v. Castle, (1892) 51 Minn. 428, 53 N. W. 651 ; Gold v. Ogden, (1895)
61 Minn. 88, 63 N. W. 266. Sayre v. Burdock, (1891) 47 Minn. 367, 50 N.
W. 245, apparently extends the rule to parol evidence rule problems.
94(1895) 61 Minn. 88, 63 N. W. 266. See also Conn. Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Knapp, (1895) 62 Minn. 405, at 407, 64 N. W. 1137. Also refer to
cases in footnote 93, stepra.
O-Germain v. Great Northern Lbr. Co., (1919) 143 Minn. 311, 173 N.
W. 667; also see Wood v. Johnson, (1912) 117 Minn. 267, 270, 135 N.
W. 746.
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tions, the general rule has been applied to donee beneficiary situa-
tions in other states, and no sound reason why it should not be
applied similarly in Minnesota seems apparent.
This rule, therefore, prevents B from recovering against R if
any of the elements of a valid contract are absent as between R and
E. That is, the offer must be accepted by the party to the contract. 6
R must have made a promise,17 and it must be supported by legally
sufficient consideration from E? The promise, however, may be a
limited one. And the third party can claim the performance of the
promise only to the extent of its intent."9 Moreover, "the promisor's
promise to the promisee need not be express but can be ... im-
plied."'' But, in any event, the promise would seem to be required
to be a clear, distinct, and definite one before a beneficiary can base
any rights upon it."" B also must belong to the class for whose
benefit the promise is made.' 2 But his rights thereunder need not
be certain at the time the contract is made.103 The promise may be
conditional, but B cannot enforce it until that condition exists.'
Likewise, B must have performed whatever was required of him
before he can enforce the contract.'"' Apparently B need not be
the beneficiary of all the promises in the contract.106 Moreover, R's
9"Kruske v. Jevne, (1928) 174 Minn. 484, 219 N. W. 766.
'1Nelson v. Rogers, (1891) 47 Minn. 103, 49 N. W. 526; Gold V.
Ogden, (1895) 61 Minn. 88, 63 N. W. 266; Clement v. Willett, (1908) 105
Minn. 267, 117 N. W. 491; Odenbreit v. Utheim, (1915) 131 Minn. 56, 154
N. W. 741.
' Becker v. Nelson, (1925) 164 Minn. 367, 205 N. W. 262; cf. Moulton
v. Haskell, (1892) 50 Minn. 367, 52 N. W. 960, and similar cases.
""Bell v. Mendenhall, (1898) 71 Minn. 331, 73 N. W. 886.
','National Cash Register Co. v. Ness, (1938) 204 Minn. 148, 282 N.
W. 827.
'"
1 Allen v. Hoopes, (1933) 189 Minn. 391, 249 N. W. 570.
''-Maxfield v. Schwartz, (1890) 43 Minn. 221, 45 N. W. 429, 10 L.R.A.
606; Gaffney v. Sederberg, (1911) 114 Minn. 319, 131 N. W. 333; Bell v.
Mendenhall, (1898) 71 Minn. 331, 73 N. W. 1086. See also Lovejoy v.
Howe, (1893) 55 Minn. 353, 57 N. W. 57.
11'"LaMourea v. Rhude, (1940) 209 Minn. 53, 295 N. W. 304. See also
McCulloch v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co., (U. S. Dist. Ct. for Minn. 1943)
53 Fed. Supp. 534, and Moulton v. Haskell, (1892) 50 Minn. 367, 52 N.
W. 960.
",'Greenwood v. Sheldon, (1883) 31 Minn. 254, 17 N. W. 478.
"I-Odenbreit v. Utheim, (1915) 131 Minn. 56, 154 N. W. 741; see
Brasch v. Reeves, (1913) 124 Minn. 114, 144 N. W. 744; compare In re
Ocrtle, (1885) 34 Minn. 173, 24 N. W. 924, 57 A.S.R. 48 and similar cases.
1'1"Stariha v. Greenwood, (1883) 28 Minn. 521, 11 N. W. 76, holds that
the promise to pay the mortgage therein need only be a part of the con-
sideration, thus necessarily holding that other promises of which B is not
the beneficiary can exist without defeating his rights. See also McCulloch
v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co., (U. S. Dist. Ct. for Minn., 1943) 53 Fed.
Supp. 534.
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promise may be such that the beneficiary is relieved of an obligation
and can raise the promise as a defense to another action. 0 7
Fraud also is a defense, although the proof must be strong,1'",
and the parol evidence rule and the Statute of Limitations"" may
prevent proof of some of the facts necessary to the action. Likewise,
the court may lack jurisdiction.110 And in cases involving surety-
ship rules a change of the agreement without the surety's (R)
consent can terminate B's rights against R.1 1 Such equitable de-
fenses as a mutual mistake can defeat B's action without first seek-
ing to reform the contract.1 12 But the Statute of Frauds has been
held not to be a defense against a creditor beneficiary. 3 The de-
fense of "res adjudicata" does not seem valid as against a bene-
ficiary merely because that defense exists as against the promis-
ee.11 4 Moreover, the beneficiary is a real party in interest within
the meaning of the statute and can maintain an action in his own
107DeCock v. O'Connell, (1933) 188 Minn. 228, 246 N. W. 885, 248 N.
W. 829.
'
0 sMaxfield v. Schwartz, (1890) 45 Minn. 150, 47 N. W. 448, 10 L.R.A.
606; Becker v. Nelson, (1925) 164 Minn. 367, 205 N. W. 262. In the Max-
field case the court pointed out, at page 152, that the beneficiaries did "not
stand in such a position that the doctrine of estoppel, or any rule of
necessity under the common law, as might be the case with respect to
negotiable paper, should bar the defense of fraud." Whether the court was
talking of the third party beneficiaries generally or of these particular bene-
ficiaries is not entirely clear from the opinion. Probably the latter is in-
tended, however.
losSayre v. Burdock, (1891) 47 Minn. 367, 50 N. W. 246; Kramer v.
Gardner, (1908) 104 Minn. 370, 116 N. W. 925; Germain v. Great Northern
Lbr. Co., (1919) 143 Minn. 311, 173 N. W. 667 (all parol evidence rule
cases). Pinch v. McCulloch, (1898) 72 Minn. 71, 74 N. W. 897. (Statute
of Limitations. Here defendant contended that the statute started to run
when the promise was made. The court held that it started to run against
R in this creditor beneficiary case when the debt obligation became due and
an action on it was possible.)
"10 See Odenbreit v. Utheim, (1915) 131 Minn. 56, 154 N. W. 741.
1 t tTravers v. Dorr, (1895) 60 Minn. 173, 62 N. W. 269, is the leading
case. Other cases holding similarly are Goesbech v. Mattison, (1890) 43
Minn. 546, 46 N. W. 135; Heidahl v. Geiser Mfg. Co., (1910) 112 Minn.
319, 127 N. W. 1050, and cases cited therein.
11-2Rogers v. Castle, (1892) 51 Minn. 428, 53 N. W. 651.
113Goetz v. Foos, (1869) 14 Minn. 265 (Gil. 196) ; Sullivan v. Murphy,
(1876) 23 Minn. 6; Stariha v. Greenwood, (1881) 28 Minn. 521, 11 N.
W. 76. All three cases hold that R's promise to E was not within the
Statute of Frauds provision relating to promises to answer for the debt,
default, or doings of another, because the promise was made to one to whom
the debt was owed.
ll 4Consider Ingelson v. Olson, (1937) 199 Minn. 422, 272 N. W. 270.
As a practical matter, however, the existence of such a defense against E
probably would discourage many beneficiaries from suing, for B's rights
are no greater than E's and probably would be determined in most instances
upon the same premises as E's rights.
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name."2  He also may assign his chose in action on the contract
after it had accrued.116
An early Minnesota case held that a creditor beneficiary can-
not join R and E as defendants in the action to enforce his rights
on the contract between them,"' but in later cases B has joined
them and no objection has been made.i" There is no doubt that a
creditor beneficiary invariably possesses separate rights of action
against E on the debt in addition to his rights against R on the
contract. 11 Such remedies are consistent and concurrent, and he
need not elect between them. " ° Although action against one is not
fatal to an action against the other, only one satisfaction may be
obtained, of course.'' Moreover, if R and E are not joined by the
beneficiary, E, on R's motion, "might be compelled to interplead
and take part in the litigation; but this does not demonstrate any-
thing more than that, under some circumstances, one or both might
be proper parties to the action."'-2 The modern tendency would seem
to be contrary to the early case preventing joinder. The benefici-
ary's right to intervene in an action between the promisee and
promisor (in the court's discretion) seems clear.123
The promisor (R) also may be sued by the promisee (E) of
the third party creditor beneficiary contract in Minnesota, although
"'Maxcy v. N. H. Fire Ins. Co., (1893) 54 Minn. 272, 55 N. W. 1130,
40 A.S.R. 325; Harriet State Bank v. Samels, (1925) 164 Minn. 265, 204
N. W. 938.
'%1Maxcy v. N. H. Fire Ins. Co., (1893) 54 Minn. 272, 55 N. W. 1130
40 A.S.R. 325.
"'1Sanders v. Classon, (1868) 13 Minn. 379 (Gil. 352).
"
8SIn Peterson v. Parviainen, (1928) 174 Minn. 279, 219 N. W. 180,
judgment was entered against both the promisor and the promisee by the
beneficiary. See also Gaffney v. Sederberg, (1911) 114 Minn. 319, 131 N.
W. 333; Marshall State Bank v. Buesing, (1929) 179 Minn. 77, 228 N.
W. 348.
""0Barnes v. Hekla Fire Ins. Co., (1893) 56 Minn. 38, 57 N. W. 314;
Bell v. Mendenhall, (1898) 71 Minn. 331, 73 N. W. 1086. ("The plaintiff
may maintain a separate action upon each promise at the same or different
times, for such remedies are consistent and concurrent." at page 337);
Maddy v. Nat'l. Life Ins. Co., (1923) 156 Minn. 375, 194 N. W. 880; see
also Guderian v. Leland, (1895) 61 Minn. 67, 63 N. W. 175, and Pinch v.
McCulloch, (1898) 72 Minn. 71, 74 N. W. 897, in which the action was
against E. Compare Sherwood v. O'Brien, (1894) 58 Minn. 76, 79, 59 N.
W. 957, 958.
""ORefer to first three cases cited in footnote 119, supra.
"']Barnes v. Hekla Fire Ins. Co., (1893) 56 Minn. 38, 57 N. W. 314;
Heins v. Byers, (1928) 174 Minn. 350, 219 N. W. 287.
"2'Maxcy v. N. H. Fire Ins. Co., (1893) 54 Minn. 272, at 275 and 276,
55 N. W. 1130.
"'3Kniefel v. Keller, (1940) 207 Minn. 109, 290 N. W. 218.
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other courts are split on the question.1 2 4 Generally speaking, the
measure of damages is the amount of debt which R promised to
pay to B for E.1 25 E need not pay the debt before suing R,r' '  and
he may join several promisors as defendants, at least if their
promises pertain to related debts and contracts. 127 Although the
promisors have argued that two recoveries are possible under this
rule, the court has replied that
"With us equity and law are fused. It may be that the defend-
ants could require the money paid to the -plaintiff to be applied to
the debt; or if judgment is obtained against them could obtain re-
lief giving them equivalent protection, or before judgment could
adopt such procedure as would prevent double payment. The
danger of being subjected to double payment is not great.12 5
Whether this rule also applies to promisees in donee beneficiary
contracts has been questioned by some writers, and Minnesota
really never has decided the question. Clearwater Creamery As-
sociation v. Hoveland,29 which pertains to the problem, was de-
cided before donee beneficiary contracts were recognized in Minne-
sota. Consequently, most of its reasoning is not applicable now,
and the result of the case seems open to criticism.
II.
TER-MINATION OF THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY CONTRACTS
The Minnesota Supreme Court recognizes that B's rights are
based upon the contract between E and R and not upon an inde-
124Merriam v. Pine City Lbr. Co., (1877) 23 Minn. 314; Heins v. Byers,
(1928) 174 Minn. 350, 219 N. W. 287; Gustafson v. Koehler, (1929) 177
Minn. 115, 224 N. W. 699; cf. Price v. Doyle, (1885) 34 Minn. 400, 26
N. W. 14.
125Merriam v. Pine City Lbr. Co., (1877) 23 Minn. 214; Heins v.
Byers, (1928) 174 Minn. 350, 219 N. W. 287. In Klemnik v. Henrickson
Jewelry Co., (1913) 122 Minn. 380, 142 N. W. 871, the court said E could
recover "at least nominal damages."
12NMerriam v. Pine City Lbr. Co., (1877) 23 Minn. 314; "In Peterson
v. Herrington, (1926) 169 Minn. 65, 210 N. W. 617, the court held that a
mortgage assumption clause imposes an absolute liability and not a contract
of indemnity; . . ." Gustafson v. Koehler, (1929) 177 Minn. 115, 224 N.
W. 699.
12"Klemnik v. Henrickson Jewelry Co., (1913) 122 Minn. 380, 142 N.
W. 871. In this case the plaintiff entered into separate contracts with
separate persons in which the latter in each instance agreed to pay dif-
ferent debts than the promisors in the other contracts agreed to pay. The
court permitted E to join all of them as defendants in one action. The debts
involved had been contracted by plaintiff in the jewelry business which the
defendants purchased at different times.
1-°SHeins v. Bye's, (1928) 174 Minn. 350, 353, 219 N. W. 287; see also
Gustafson v. Koehler, (1929) 177 Minn. 115, 224 N. W. 699.
129 (1925) 165 Minn. 163, 205 N. W. 895.
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pendent theory of action. 130 But few Minnesota cases have involved
the question of how and when a third party beneficiary contract is
terminated. Perhaps the best way to avoid the problem is to in-
clude in the third party beneficiary contract a clear provision
governing its duration and termination. But in the absence of such
a provision, certain rules must be applied.
No doubt exists that in the creditor beneficiary situation repre-
sented by the mortgage cases the contract can be terminated as to
E's liability (mortgagor-grantor) if B (the mortgagee) extends
the time for payment of the mortgage by R (the mortgagor's as-
suming grantee) without obtaining E's consent. 31 However, the
promisee's liability is terminated only to the extent it is affected
by the release. 132 This rule is based upon equity rules, since the
promisee is held to be in a suretyship relation with B.' 3 The broad
reasoning of the Minnesota cases dealing with this rule seems ap-
plicable to all creditor beneficiary situations, and the Restatement
of Contracts has stated the rule as applying to all creditor bene-
ficiary contracts. 34 Minnesota also has recognized the Restatement
rule that a creditor beneficiary contract may be terminated, within
limits, by the parties (E and R) to the contract.3 5 Thus, in Min-
nesota,
"A discharge of the promisor by the promisee in a contract
or a variation thereof by them is effective against a creditor bene-
ficiary if
liuLa'Mourea v. Rhude, (1940) 209 Minn. 53, 295 N. W. 304; McCulloch
v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co., (U. S. Dist. Ct. for Minn., 1943) 53 Fed.
Supp. 534.
13'Travers v. Dorr, (1895) 60 Minn. 173, 62 N. W. 269; Jefferson
County Bank v. Erickson, (1933) 188 Minn. 354, 247 N. W. 245; Rjise Lbr.
Co. v. Enkema, (1921) 148 Minn. 5, 181 N. W. 201. The Negotiable Instru-
ments Law (2 Mason's 1927 Minn. Statutes, Sec. 7044) does not prevent
the release by lack of consent to extension. Jefferson County Bank v. Erick-
son, .supra.
'--Travers v. Dorr, (1895) 60 Minn. 173, 62 N. W. 269.
1 aTravers v. Dorr, (1895) 60 Minn. 173, 62 N. W. 269.
l' 4Restatement of Contracts, Sec. 146. In determining if E has given his
consent to the extension, "The law does not require consent to be in writing,
nor does it call for the action by a board of directors when a corporation
is an actor. 'Whether the surety in any given case did or did not consent
to such an extension is a question of fact, which may be proved in the same
manner as any other fact, the evidence of which need not be in writing, by
circumstantial evidence.' Bandler v. Bradley, 110 Minn. 66, 124 N. W. 644,
645. Since it need not be in writing, an officer in active charge of the busi-
ness of a corporation ought not to be required to have written authorization
to consent to an extension. By consenting to the extension the corporation
entered into no obligation." Amidon v. Traverse Land Co., (1930) 181 Minn.
249, 232 N. W. 33.
'
35Morstain v. Kirscher, (1933) 190 Minn. 78, 250 N. W. 727.
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(a) the creditor beneficiary does not bring suit upon the
promise or otherwise materially change his position in reliance
thereon before he knows of the discharge or variation."''
Although the court seemed to recognize the rule only as it ap-
plied "to the facts of this case," the rule seems sound when applied
to creditor beneficiary contracts generally. In Maxfield v. Schwartz,
137 which was not a mortgage case, the court recognized that
rescission of the contract after suit is commenced is "impossible."
It said, ". . . it being, as they now admit, impossible to now rescind,
they would be bound to perform the agreement." And in Gold v.
Ogden'" Justice Mitchell pointed out, obiter dictum, that B had
not shown he relied upon the contract or even knew of its existence
until action was commenced and that "neither are there any facts
proven to have intervened from which any equity could arise in
their favor." Consequently, it seems reasonable to conclude that
Minnesota is in accord with Section 143 of the Restatement of
Contracts.'"9
Minnesota appears never to have decided if a donee beneficiary
contract may be rescinded by the acts of the promisor and promisee.
The Restatement of Contracts, Section 142, declares that a donee
beneficiary contract cannot be rescinded without the consent of the
beneficiary. This rule, however, is based upon an analogy to life in-
surance policies which, according to Professor Williston, the Re-
porter for the Restatement of Contracts, is a law peculiar to
itself. 4 0 Certainly rules which govern a subject peculiar to itself
cannot be sound precedent for a situation which is not necessarily
within the scope of the subject. The problem raised by this section
has been dealt with expressly by the United States District Court
for Minnesota in McCulloch v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co."4" That
case involved New York law. But Minnesota derived its third party
beneficiary law from New York and, like New York, uses many of
the same rules. Consequently, that case seems to have weight in
Minnesota. Moreover, the question never had been decided specifi-
cally in New York, so this case represents what the United States
Court for this District believes is a sound rule in light of principles
'36Restatement of Contracts, Sec. 143.
137(1890) 45 Minn. 150, at 151, 47 N. W. 448, 10 L.R.A. 606.
138(1895) 61 Minn. 88, 63 N. W. 266; compare Becker v. Nelson,
(1925) 164 Minn. 367, 205 N. W. 262, in which the court pointed out that
B had not altered his position by reason of R's acts.
'39See also the Restatement of Contracts, Minnesota Annotations, See.
143.
1402 Williston on Contracts, Sec. 369, page 1079.
141(U. S. Dist. Ct. for Minn., 1943) 53 Fed. Supp. 534.
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similar to (if not identical with) Minnesota's. Judge Nordbye
reasoned the problem and held in that case, at pages 545 and 546,
as follows:
"But plaintiff argues that, in any event, he should be a donee
beneficiary and that his rights as a donee beneficiary could not be
extinguished without his consent. See Restatement of Contracts,
Section 142. While it must be recognized that the Restatement as-
sumes to lay down the broad rule that a third party donee bene-
ficiary contract cannot be rescinded without the donee's consent,
this rule is not followed by the majority of courts. 2 Williston on
Contracts, Sec. 396; 13 C. J. 602; 17 C.J.S., Contracts, No. 390;
note, 53 A.L.R. 178. The only condition laid down by the majority
of the courts with reference to the rescission of a donee beneficiary
contract is that there must be an absence of reliance on the contract
by the third party beneficiary.
"Although New York does not seem to have considered ex-
pressly whether this majority rule, or any other rule, is applicable
to donee beneficiary contracts, it has applied the majority rule con-
sistently to creditor beneficiaries; (citing cases) and there seems
little doubt that, as Professor Williston concludes, Nev York also
will apply the majority rule to donee beneficiary contracts.
"In Gifford v. Corrigan, supra, Justice Finch declared that the
rules governing the rescission of a third party beneficiary contract
must be framed in the light of the theory upon which they are en-
forced. New York enforces donee and creditor beneficiary contracts
upon the same theory, i.e., intent to benefit the third party by the
contract. See Seaver v. Ransom, supra, in which Justice Pound
states the rule as applicable to all the classes of third party bene-
ficiaries, including creditor beneficiaries, which are recognized in
New York; see also Lawrence v. Fox, supra, Graybar Elec. Co.,
v. Seaboard Surety Co., supra, Wilson v. Costich Co., supra, and
Fosmire v. Natl. Surety Co., supra. Therefore, since no distinguish-
ing factors which require a different result are apparent, it seems
to follow that the majority rule which New York applies to creditor
beneficiary contracts must also be applied to donee beneficiary con-
tracts.
"The main arguments advanced in favor of the rule advocated
by the plaintiff with reference to donee beneficiary contracts are
that a beneficiary in a life insurance policy cannot be changed
without the consent of the existing beneficiary, and that, where
there is a gift, it cannot be revoked without the donee's consent.
But it will be seen that neither of these situations is analagous to
the donee's rights under a third party beneficiary contract. First,
it may be observed that insurance law is peculiar to itself. There
has grown up in that field principles of law which are not applica-
ble elsewhere. Public policy and the relationship between the
parties largely have influenced the rule with reference to the change
of beneficiaries in a life insurance contract. Therein, because of the
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peculiarity of the law, a beneficiary has a vested interest in absence
,of the right to change beneficiaries. Nor is the rule regarding re-
vocation of gifts helpful, or persuasive in determining the rule as
to the rescission of a third party beneficiary contract. Where a
gift is executed, the donee accepts the gift from the donor and
usually possession then rests in the donee. There is the element
of delivery and the element of reliance by the donee on that which
was done. In the instant situation, the only so-called gift created
was the right of exchange of Fives for Fours which was never
relied upon and which was never accepted by the donees prior to
rescission. The mere execution of a contract creating third party
beneficiary rights does not necessarily create a valid gift to a third
party. The contracts are not analagous. Compare Deyo v. Adams,
178 Misc. 859, 36 N.Y.S. 2d 734, with Warren v. United States,
1929, 68 Ct. Cl. 634, certiorari denied 1930, 281 U. S. 739. 50 S.
Ct. 346, 74 L. Ed. 1154, and Franklin Washington Trust Co. v.
Beltram, 1943, 133 N. J. Eq. 11, 29 A. 2d 854. In any event, New
York enforces third party beneficiary contracts because it is 'just
and practical' to do so (Seaver v. Ransome, supra [224 N. Y. 233,
120 N. E. 640, 2 A.L.R. 1187])-not because of any technical
rules of legalism. Consequently, analogies to insurance and prop-
erty law seem to be of little help. That the majority rule satisfies
the equitable principles of the theory adopted by New York courts
and is entirely practical seems free from doubt. No one has sug-
gested any cogent reason why the rights of a donee beneficiary
should be any more sacrosanct than the rights of a creditor bene-
ficiary, and there is nothing to indicate that the New York courts
would make any distinction in their rights when a rescission has
taken place."
These exact arguments also are applicable in Minnesota as shown
by authority already cited throughout this article. Moreover, if
donee beneficiary contract situations are so similar to creditor bene-
ficiary situations that in many instances they can be defined by the
same rule (as Minnesota Supreme Court necessarily recognized
when it permitted donee beneficiary contracts to be enforced upon
the theory that they were within the creditor beneficiary rules of
Jefferson v. Asch) then it seems necessarily to follow that they
are so factually similar that they must be terminable also according
to the same rules unless they are obviously inapplicable (as is Sec-
tion 142 (b) of the Restatement because a donee beneficiary situa-
tion excludes creditors from its scope). The rule that Minnesota
has adopted in creditor beneficiary situations is clearly applicable.
Such a rule also is in accord with the reluctance shown by the
Minnesota court in granting all donee beneficiaries the right to en-
force the contract. For it grants greater freedom of action to R
BENEFICIARY CONTRACTS
and E and restricts the rights of the donee beneficiary more than
does the rule of the Restatement. If the rule of the Restatement is
adopted, then (ironically) the donee beneficiary whom the courts
have been reluctant to recognize will find himself in a better
position than the creditor beneficiary whom the court has favored
from the beginning. The court seems neither to have said anything
nor done anything which shows a switch of its affection to the
donee beneficiary now that he is recognized in Minnesota. It is
submitted that in view of the history of the donee beneficiary in
linnesota and sound reason, the rule applicable to creditor bene-
ficiary cases also should be applied to donee beneficiary situations.
Conclusion
In summary, therefore, the following general conclusions seem
warranted:
1. Minnesota recognizes that both the donee beneficiary con-
tract and the creditor beneficiary contract can be enforced unless
a valid defense exists thereto.
2. Minnesota recognizes that a donee beneficiary contract and
a creditor beneficiary contract exist only when an intent to benefit
the third party is shown. If no intent to benefit is shown, the third
party who seeks to enforce the contract is only an incidental bene-
ficiary.
3. Minnesota permits a creditor beneficiary contract to be
rescinded by the promisee's and promisor's action if the beneficiary
has not brought action upon the contract prior to rescission or
changed his position in reliance upon the contract before he learns
of the rescission. Although Minnesota never has met the problem
of rescission with respect to a donee beneficiary contract, the history
of Minnesota cases and sound reason seem to justify a rule like
the one applied in creditor beneficiary cases.
These rules, apparently firmly rooted in Minnesota juris-
prudence, are still young as compared to many legal principles.
They have developed in spite of the common law. They have de-
veloped because, as Professor Corbin has said,
"Law is not a complete and perfect system of unchangeable
rules, handed down on some Sinai in the dark infinity of the past.
Instead it is an ever changing and developing system of rules,
every judicial decision as well as every legislative act being a part
of the never ending process of creation.' 4 2
142Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons, 46 Law Quart.
Rev. 12, 44.
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Resorting merely to the old common law and its corollaries for the
determination of questions involved under the doctrine of third
party beneficiary contracts will not necessarily solve all the prob-
lems. The old common law did not recognize the doctrine. The
principles must be developed with a view to their own American
history and to equity-their reason for existing.
